



N-CFSAC

Supporting Documentation Package 3

September 10-12, 2024



Table of Contents

Task 1 Statement.....	
Commercial Fishing Vessel PACIFIC RANGER Report of Investigation	Tab 1
Commercial Fishing Vessel MAKAH MAID Report of Investigation.....	Tab 2
Commercial Fishing Vessel LANGLEY DOUGLAS Report of Investigation.....	Tab 3

Task Statement # 25-24

Make recommendations to the Coast Guard on implementing a Safety Management System (SMS) for CFVs less than 200GT (factoring 33 Code of Federal Regulations § 96.120).



United States Coast Guard

MISLE Incident Investigation Report For F/V PACIFIC RANGER; Collision with a Helicopter

On 02Mar2013 00:00:00 Z



MISLE Activity Number: 4544170
MISLE Case Number: 629056

U.S. Department of
Homeland Security

United States
Coast Guard



Commandant
United States Coast Guard

U.S. Coast Guard STOP 7501
2703 Martin Luther King Jr. Ave. SE
Washington, DC 20593-7501
Staff Symbol: CG-INV
Phone: (202) 372-1030
Fax: (202) 372-1904

16732/IIA#4544170
17 May 2022

**THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE COMMERCIAL FISHING VESSEL PACIFIC
RANGER AND A HELICOPTER RESULTING IN LOSS OF LIFE IN THE PACIFIC
OCEAN ON MARCH 2, 2013**

ACTION BY THE COMMANDANT

The record and the report of the investigation convened for the subject casualty have been reviewed. The record and the report, including the findings of fact, analysis, and conclusions are approved. The investigation's safety recommendations remain under review. The Commandant's response to the recommendations and any resulting actions will be documented separately. This marine casualty investigation is closed.



J. D. NEUBAUER

Captain, U.S. Coast Guard
Chief, Office of Investigations & Casualty Analysis (CG-INV)

U.S. Department
of Homeland Security
**United States
Coast Guard**



Commander
United States Coast Guard
Sector Guam

PSC 455 Box 176
FPO AP 96540
Staff Symbol: (spv)
Phone: 671-355-4944
Fax: 671-355-4888
Email: [REDACTED]@uscg.mil

16732
03 September 2013

MEMORANDUM

From: [REDACTED]
Lead Investigating Officer

To: Casey J White, CAPT [REDACTED]
CG SECTOR Guam (S [REDACTED])

Subj: F/V PACIFIC RANGER COLLISION WITH HELICOPTER N471M

Ref: (a) Letter of Designation as Investigating Officer, of 13 Aug 12
(b) Marine Safety Manual COMDTINST M16000.10A, Volume V
(c) Navigation Rules, International – Inland, COMDTINST M16672.2D

Preliminary Statement:

In accordance with reference (a), I was designated and directed to conduct an informal investigation into the collision between the U.S. flagged Distant Water Tuna Fleet uninspected Commercial Fishing Vessel F/V PACIFIC RANGER, Official Number 1214248, and helicopter N471M on 02 March 2013, which resulted in persons injured and one death. With the assistance of LT [REDACTED], LT [REDACTED], and MK1 [REDACTED] I was able to conduct interviews, gather facts, perform an analysis and draw conclusions regarding this case. All times listed in the Report of Investigation are in Lima time (+11 GMT). The MISLE Activity number is: 4544170.


Executive Summary:

On 02 March 2013, at approximately 1350 hrs, the F/V PACIFIC RANGER was underway in the Pacific Ocean approximately 500 nautical miles south of Pohnpei, Federated States of Micronesia. While approaching a Fish Aggregating Device (FAD), the helicopter N471M "buzzed" the F/V PACIFIC RANGER and proceeded to a hover above the FAD in an effort to claim it for their fishing vessel, the F/V FONG KUO #869. Subsequently, the F/V PACIFIC RANGER collided with the tail rotor of the helicopter N471M, which resulted in the helicopter crashing into the ocean and resting inverted in the water. Accordingly, the pilot was injured and was able to emergency egress from the inverted wreckage; however, the spotter was killed. The helicopter's inflatable pontoons kept the wreckage afloat.

Subj: F/V PACIFIC RANGER COLLISION WITH HELICOPTER
N471M

16732
03 September 2013

Once the F/V PACIFIC RANGER stopped, a full rescue effort was initiated by launching the vessel's small boats. As the small boats arrived at the helicopter wreckage, numerous crewmembers from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER jumped into the water to assist in the rescue. As a result, one of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER's crewmembers was injured. The other crewmembers found the pilot and assisted him onto one of the small boats; however, the spotter was submerged and still tethered to the helicopter. The spotter was unconscious after being brought to the surface and did not appear to be breathing. Attempts to revive the spotter using CPR were unsuccessful and he died as a result of the crash.



Subj: F/V PACIFIC RANGER COLLISION WITH HELICOPTER
N471M

16732
03 September 2013

Vessel Data:

Name:	PACIFIC RANGER
Official Number:	1214248
IMO Number:	9394789
Service:	Commercial Fishing Vessel
Year Built:	2006
Built By:	Fong Kuo Shipbuilding Co. Ltd.
Gross Tons:	1415 ITC
Length:	209.3 feet
Propulsion:	Single Inboard Diesel
Owner:	Pacific Ranger LLC/South Pacific Tuna Corp.
Operator:	Pacific Global LLC/South Pacific Tuna Corp.

Helicopter Data:

Manufacturer:	Hughes
Model/Series Number:	369HS
Registration Number:	N471M
Serial Number:	1140671S
Service:	Fish Spotter Aircraft
Owner:	Jerry's Helicopter Service Inc.
Operator:	Hansen Helicopter Service Inc.

Personnel Data:

Name/Nationality	DOB	Gender	Role	Status
Shuiyao Wang/China	04/25/64	M	Fish Spotter (Helicopter)	Deceased
[REDACTED] Philippines	[REDACTED]	M	Helicopter Pilot	Injured
[REDACTED] China	[REDACTED]	M	Oiler (Rescuer)	Injured
[REDACTED] Taiwan	[REDACTED]	M	Fish Master	Not at risk
[REDACTED] II/USA	[REDACTED]	M	Master (Paper)	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Taiwan	[REDACTED]	M	Navigator	Not at risk
[REDACTED] China	[REDACTED]	M	Chief Engineer	Not at risk
[REDACTED] China	[REDACTED]	M	Interpreter	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Vietnam	[REDACTED]	M	Fish Spotter	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Vietnam	[REDACTED]	M	Chief Officer (Paper)	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Vietnam	[REDACTED]	M	Chief Engineer (Paper)	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Philippines	[REDACTED]	M	Helicopter Pilot	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Philippines	[REDACTED]	M	Helicopter Mechanic	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Nauru	[REDACTED]	M	Fish Observer (Gov.)	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Vietnam	[REDACTED]	M	Seaman (Rescuer)	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Vietnam	[REDACTED]	M	Seaman (Rescuer)	Not at risk
[REDACTED] Vietnam	[REDACTED]	M	Seaman (Rescuer)	Not at risk

Findings of Fact:

1. The F/V PACIFIC RANGER is a U.S. documented 1415 gross ton (GT ITC) uninspected Commercial Fishing Vessel (CFV). It is a foreign built purse seine vessel which has been US flagged. The regulations that govern the F/V PACIFIC RANGER are found in Title 46 of the Code of Federal Regulation, Subchapter C – Uninspected Vessels.
2. The F/V PACIFIC RANGER is owned by Pacific Ranger, LLC and operated by Pacific Global, LLC, which is run under the umbrella of the South Pacific Tuna Corp. (SPTC). The F/V PACIFIC RANGER is one of approximately 30 purse seine vessels in the Distant Water Tuna Fleet (DWTF) that fish in the Pacific Ocean waters belonging to several island nations, under the South Pacific Tuna Treaty (SPTT). It is one of 14 vessels managed by SPTC.
3. The F/V PACIFIC RANGER is required to be manned by a U.S. Coast Guard licensed Master, Mate and Chief Engineer IAW 46 CFR Part 15; however, the F/V PACIFIC RANGER has received a manning waiver that allows a foreign Mate and a foreign Chief Engineer aboard to fill those positions. This waiver for the U.S. citizenship manning requirements is issued by the U.S. Coast Guard through the Coast Guard Authorization Act, under the claim that there are no qualified U.S. citizens available to fill the manning positions. Eligibility requirements for the manning waiver are outlined in CG-543 Policy Letter 11-05, and include an annual Commercial Fishing Vessel Exam by a qualified Marine Inspector, qualification of the foreign Officers through the Standards of Training for Crew and Watch standers (STCW) and at least one annual port call to Guam or America Samoa.
4. The Licensed Master, Mr. [REDACTED] admitted that he did not perform the navigation duties normally entitled for the Captain. The Fish Master, Mr. [REDACTED] was “in charge” of the bridge during the day and stayed on the bridge during daylight hours while fishing. Mr. [REDACTED] identified himself as a “Paper Captain” in his statement.
5. All crewmembers aboard the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, with the exception of the U.S. Master, are foreign nationals. Both the licensed Mate and the licensed Chief Engineer aboard are citizens of Vietnam and do not speak English. Mr. [REDACTED] is a citizen of Taiwan and the acting Chief Engineer is a citizen of China; neither of them speaks English. The U.S. Master must communicate with his crew through a translator. In many cases, the message must be communicated through another translator to the Vietnamese and Indonesian crewmembers. The following chart identifies the different crew nationalities aboard the F/V PACIFIC RANGER during the incident:

NATIONALITY	NO. OF CREW
United States of America	1
Taiwan	5
Peoples Republic of China	6
Vietnam	10
Indonesia	10
Nauru	1
Philippines	2

6. On 28 December 2012 a CFV Dockside Safety Examination was performed by USCG Marine Safety Detachment American Samoa onboard the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. Thirteen deficiencies were issued relating to accommodation/occupational safety, electrical, engineering, pollution prevention, construction/loadline, and fire fighting. After a deficiency follow-up exam was completed, a safety decal was issued on 04 January 2013.

7. Weather report for 02 March 2013 indicated temperature ranged between 75 and 91 degrees F. Visibility was unlimited, with wind speed between 5 and 9 mph from the southeast.

8. On 02 March 2013, at approximately 1345 hrs, the F/V PACIFIC RANGER was underway in the Pacific Ocean at Lat. 00-30.184 S and Long. 156-33.147 E transiting at approximately 12 knots with the throttle position at Full Ahead. The vessel was nearly fully laden with its catch and all of the fish wells were full of water, a condition known as being "tanked down." This made the F/V PACIFIC RANGER very heavy in the water.

9. At approximately 1345 hrs, the fish spotter from the helicopter N471M spotted a "foamer" which is an indicator of schooling fish. The helicopter pilot, Mr. [REDACTED] was directed by his vessel to investigate the area. At this point in time, Mr. [REDACTED] witnessed a vessel in the vicinity of the schooling fish.

10. At approximately 1348 hrs, Mr. [REDACTED], from his lookout position on the mast, spotted a Fish Aggregating Device (FAD) approximately one-half nautical mile away and relayed its position to Mr. [REDACTED] on the bridge. Mr. [REDACTED] immediately changed course, pointing the bow of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER directly toward the FAD. Mr. [REDACTED] continued at a speed of approximately 12 knots toward the FAD.

11. At this time, Mr. [REDACTED] decided to fly toward the vessel that was heading for the FAD and the schooling fish. According to witness statements, the helicopter flew much closer than 500 feet from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER.

12. At approximately 1349 hrs, crewmembers on the helicopter deck noticed an unknown helicopter approaching the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. The helicopter circled the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, making more than one pass. The flight mechanic, Mr. [REDACTED] and the vessel's interpreter, Mr. [REDACTED] identified the helicopter's tail number as N471M. The helicopter was assigned to the F/V FONG KUO #869.

13. At approximately 1350 hrs, helicopter N471M completed the "fly-by" and turned toward the FAD, eventually settling in a hover directly above the FAD. At this time the F/V PACIFIC RANGER was still traveling at approximately 12 knots.

14. At this point, helicopter N471M was approximately 1,000 feet (five boat lengths) from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. Mr. [REDACTED] placed the throttle position to "Dead Slow Astern" and began to increase the throttle position (in reverse) to the main propulsion engine using the standard screw adjustment. At this point, Mr. [REDACTED] was attempting to slow the vessel down while approaching the FAD. Mr. [REDACTED] also noticed the helicopter was still hovering directly in front of the vessel. Mr. [REDACTED] made no course change.

15. Mr. [REDACTED] continued to reverse the engine; however, according to him, the vessel did not appear to be slowing fast enough to avoid the helicopter. Mr. [REDACTED] then tried to override the throttle by manually increasing the engine's rpm while still in reverse. Mr. [REDACTED] felt and heard the engine becoming overloaded or "bogging down" during his attempts to slow the vessel. He was concerned that major throttle adjustments would overload the engine, resulting in the engine shutting down, leaving the vessel with no propulsion.

16. Because of the vessel's proximity to the hovering helicopter, Mr. [REDACTED] also made the decision not to turn his vessel hard to port or starboard, fearing the rotor blades on helicopter N471M may injure or kill one of his crewmembers working on the stern and net pile.

17. During this time, the Government Fisheries Observer, Mr. [REDACTED] from his stateroom noticed the vessel's main engine increase in rpm and the vessel started "shaking," a typical indicator that the vessel may be preparing to make a set or maneuver for a set. Mr. [REDACTED] made his way to the bridge from his stateroom, which is located directly below the bridge.

18. The helicopter fish spotter, Mr. Shuiyao Wang, was wearing a harness with one end of a tether-line tied to his waist and the other was attached to the seat harness hard-point, inside the helicopter. A quick-release hook was attached to the seat harness hard-point inside the helicopter and the other end that was tied to Mr. Wang did not have a quick-release hook.

19. According to Mr. [REDACTED] he went into a hover over the FAD to provide a better vantage point for his spotter to identify the owner of the FAD. Mr. [REDACTED] allowed the fish spotter to exit the helicopter and retrieve a line from the FAD with a grappling hook in order to attach their own FAD marker/transponder, which is also company policy.

20. At approximately 1351 hrs, Mr. [REDACTED] arrived on the bridge and observed the helicopter N471M in a low hover approximately 30 yards away with its tail pointing straight for the bow of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. He also noticed the helicopter fish spotter, Mr. Wang, had climbed out on the right pontoon in an attempt to claim the FAD by placing a marker/transponder from the F/V FONG KUO #869. To his recollection, Mr. [REDACTED] stated that Mr. [REDACTED] had tried to reverse the engine a few times, based on what he had "felt." He also observed Mr. [REDACTED] placing the throttle in the neutral position immediately before the collision occurred and left it in neutral until his stern was clear of the wreckage.

21. According to the flight mechanic, soon after helicopter N471M settled into a hover, he and the interpreter left the helicopter deck enroute to the flight crew quarters located one deck below to look at the "Pilot/Mechanic Vessel Schedule List." This list indicates to which vessel a helicopter was assigned. The list indicated that helicopter N471M was assigned to the FONG KUO #869 and was being flown by [REDACTED]. As they were returning from the flight crew cabin, the collision occurred. According to the flight mechanic, the entire evolution from when they left the helicopter deck to when the collision occurred was approximately 20 to 25 seconds.

22. At approximately 1353 hrs, the F/V PACIFIC RANGER's forward progress had been ceased and two small tending vessels had been launched to assist in the rescue of the crewmembers of helicopter N471M.

23. At approximately 1355 hrs, Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED], rescuers from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, recovered the injured pilot, Mr. [REDACTED], and transported him back to the F/V PACIFIC RANGER.

24. At approximately 1405 hrs, Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] rescuers from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, recovered the body of the unconscious helicopter fish spotter, Mr. [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] immediately started CPR on the fish spotter, Mr. Wang, but was unsuccessful. Mr. Wang was determined to be deceased at approximately 1415 hrs. During the rescue operation, Mr. [REDACTED] suffered cuts on his legs and testicle that required immediate first aid.

25. At approximately 1730 hrs, the wreckage of helicopter N471M, Mr. [REDACTED], and the body of Mr. Wang were transferred to the F/V FONG KUO #869.

26. At approximately 1845 hrs, Captain [REDACTED] completed a post-casualty alcohol test using a DOT-approved saliva alcohol testing kit. The test results were negative for alcohol. At this time, Captain [REDACTED] also collected a post-casualty urine sample from the Fish Master, Mr. [REDACTED] following this serious marine incident as required by 46 CFR 4.06-3. The urine sample was locked in the Captain's cabin and was kept refrigerated until the vessel returned to Pohnpei, FSM.

27. On March 6, 2013, the F/V FONG KUO #869 returned to Majuro, RMI. The body of Mr. Wang was brought to the Ministry of Health Hospital in Majuro, RMI and was officially pronounced dead.

28. On March 11, 2013, the F/V PACIFIC RANGER returned to Pohnpei, FSM. Upon arrival, Captain [REDACTED] shipped Mr. [REDACTED] urine sample to MEDTOX Laboratories, Inc. A Federal Drug Testing Custody and Control Form number Y24995353 was completed and shipped with the urine sample.

29. On March 19, 2013, Mr. [REDACTED], the pilot of helicopter N471M, was seen at The Medical City Orthopedic Department in Pasig City, Philippines for an examination. The medical report showed Mr. [REDACTED] suffered three fractured ribs as a result of the crash.

30. On March 22, 2013, MEDTOX Laboratories, Inc. received and processed the post-casualty urine sample provided by Mr. [REDACTED]. The results were negative for all drugs on the SAMHSA screening panel.

Analysis:

1. *Fishing Standard Operating Procedures:* A typical day of fishing on many of the DWTF Purse Seiners consists of navigating the vessel throughout the fishing grounds and looking for signs of fish. Nearly all of the DWTF fishing vessels have "bird radars" that can track flocks of birds potentially feeding on schooling fish. Nearly all of the DWTF fishing vessels have a Radio Directional Finder to focus in on any radio transmissions, either from vessels or from beacons. Finally, many of the DWTF fishing vessels have a helicopter to help spot fish, look for other fishing vessels, and to assist in corralling fish in an attempt to keep them together. Onboard every

DWTF fishing vessel operated by SPTC, the Fish Master is in charge of the fishing. This means, from sunrise to sunset, the Fish Master is in charge of the navigation of the vessel and in the case of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, the Fish Master was the only person on the bridge in charge of the vessel's navigation.

2. *Helicopter Procedures:* Helicopters operating from DWTF fishing vessels are hired to spot fish or signs of fish, track and observe other fishing vessels in the area, and herd or "scare" fish into a school to assist in setting the net around the fish. Helicopter pilots are required to follow company directives and regulations under 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91. Jerry's Helicopter Service, the owner of helicopter N471M, provided a letter to all of its pilots clarifying helicopter operations at sea. In the letter, it states that "aircraft will not be used for retrieval for any item, whatsoever, from the ocean unless it involves a life threatening emergency situation." 14 CFR 91.115(a) states "Each person operating an aircraft on the water shall insofar as possible, keep clear of all vessels and avoid impeding their navigation, and shall give way to any vessel or other aircraft that is given the right-of-way by any rule of this section." 14 CFR 91.115(e) states "When aircraft, or an aircraft and a vessel, approach so as to involve risk of collision, each aircraft or vessel shall proceed with careful regard to existing circumstances, including the limitations of the respective craft." 14 CFR 91.119(c) states "An altitude of 500 feet above the surface, except over open water or sparsely populated areas. In those cases, the aircraft may not be operated closer than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure."

3. *The Rescue:* Four crewmembers from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER were instructed by the Deck Boss to launch the two small boats and perform rescue actions for the helicopter's crew. All four crewmembers were not adequately trained in rescue techniques or hazards involved in wreckage. This resulted in one of the crewmembers receiving injuries that required first aid.

4. *Deficiencies in Safe Management:* SPTC has an extensive record of serious injuries and deaths aboard their vessels. Onboard the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, there appears to be a breakdown in safe management work practices resulting from deficiencies in chain of command and communication.

- a) Chain Of Command: The Chain of Command on the F/V PACIFIC RANGER lies with the unlicensed crewmembers. The Fish Master's role is designated as the person in charge of all fishing responsibilities. The Navigator (Deck Boss) reports to the Fish Master during all fishing tasks. At no point during the fishing evolution does the Deck Boss or the Fish Master report to the U.S. Master.
- b) Communications: Communication among all the crewmembers onboard F/V PACIFIC RANGER is inefficient. The vessel has a crew of 35 members, broken into seven different nationalities and languages, with only one translator aboard. The U.S. Master speaks only English, the Mate and Chief Engineer speak only Vietnamese, while Mr. [REDACTED] speaks Mandarin Chinese. The seven members of the engineering crew, technically working under the Vietnamese Chief Engineer speak Mandarin Chinese or Indonesian.

5. *Criminal acts:* There is no evidence of criminal acts being committed.

Conclusions:

1. In accordance with reference (b), the Initiating Event (or first unwanted outcome) for this casualty was the collision between the helicopter N471M and the F/V PACIFIC RANGER caused by the pilot of helicopter N471M irresponsibly placing the aircraft in the path of a fully laden fishing vessel transiting at full speed:

Organizational factors:

- a. International Standards: There are no specific Navigation Rules for low-flying or hovering aircrafts. However, in accordance with reference (c), International Rule 18(e) requires "a seaplane on the water shall, in general, keep well clear of all vessels and avoid impeding their navigation." Equally, International Rule 8 requires actions to be taken to avoid a collision.
- b. U.S. Federal Government: There is a void in regulation and external oversight of spotter helicopters operating on the high seas. There is a void in regulations for the operation of Commercial Fishing Vessels.
- c. South Pacific Tuna Corp: SPTC has adopted a practice of hiring Foreign Licensed Officers. These Foreign Officers appear to be hired only to meet the licensing requirements imposed by the USCG in the manning exemption letter; they are not actually used in their full capacity onboard the SPTC vessels. In this case, the Licensed Captain and Chief Mate were not on the bridge while an unlicensed mariner was "in charge" of the navigation of the vessel. This relinquishment of command responsibilities leads to inconsistent standards in the workplace, confusion in the chain of command, and duties being performed by untrained personnel. The South Pacific Tuna Corporation exhibits a focus on maximizing production rather than safe management. During this incident, it appears the importance is focused on making money instead of safely operating the vessel. SPTC appears to support a policy of delegating authority to members of the crew aboard F/V PACIFIC RANGER most responsible for production aboard the vessel, as opposed to the licensed officers. All evidence suggests that Mr. [REDACTED] and the Chinese Oiler are the crewmembers that are actually in charge onboard the vessel and receive backing from the Company.

Workplace factors:

- a. Training: The crew training consists of required safety orientation, minimum fire safety, and minimum lifesaving requirements specific to the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. The U.S. Licensed Master, through an interpreter, conducts this training.
- b. Organizational Structure: Aboard the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, the navigation responsibilities are left up to one person during the day. This practice prevented the persons with the most knowledge and experience of safe ship handling from being present on the bridge during standard navigation evolutions. Delegation of authority to act as the "person in charge of the navigation watch" was given to an unlicensed crewmember.

c. Operational Culture: Operations onboard F/V PACIFIC RANGER is centered on fishing and catching fish. The Fish Master and the Navigator (Deck Boss) are ultimately in charge of the fishing procedures. According to numerous statements, the licensed Chief Mate and Chief Engineer do not participate in any fishing, navigation, or engineering events. According to the U.S. Licensed Master, Captain [REDACTED], he is the "Paper Captain" and does not have full operational control of the vessel. According to Captain [REDACTED] his responsibilities consist of "all reporting of tuna catch, log books, safety drills, new crew orientations, monitoring of watches while transiting, and safety" and the Fish Master "is the main person involved in the catching of tuna."

Pre-Existing conditions:

a. Vessel Maneuverability and Equipment: The throttle control mechanism for the main propulsion engine on the F/V PACIFIC RANGER has nine positions. There are four throttle positions for ahead and four throttle positions for astern and one position for neutral. Both the ahead and astern throttle positions are: DS – Dead-Slow (range from 0 – 2.5), S – Slow (range from 2.5 – 5.5), H – Half (range from 5.5 – 8.5), and F – Full (range from 8.5 – 12). Typically, the operator will place the throttle controller in the Dead-Slow position for either ahead or astern based on the need, then use a turning knob to control the throttle position from 0 to a maximum of 12. In an emergency, the operator can manually disengage the turning knob and place the throttle position anywhere on the scale from 0 to 12. One important note; the highest astern position is located on the line between Half and Full, which means the vessel cannot go Full Astern, only to a range setting of 8.5 out of 12, or roughly 75% of the engines rated horsepower.

I. The F/V PACIFIC RANGER's main engine is designed to use the throttle position with turning knob to control the engine's rpm. Manually placing the throttle in Full Ahead or Full Astern will overload the engine, causing it to automatically shutdown. There is a 3 to 5 second delay when placing the throttle from neutral to Dead-Slow Ahead or to Dead-Slow Astern.

II. There are two control stations located on the vessel. There is only one control station on the bridge, which is located on the port side of the bridge. The other control station is located on the port side of the helicopter deck, located on the uppermost deck of the vessel's superstructure. This is due to the fact that this vessel is designed to fish from only the port side.

III. The control station on the bridge has restricted visibility for aircraft traffic. The operator located at the control station on the bridge has unlimited visibility along the surface of the water, but cannot see any aircraft traffic above an angle of approximately 30 degrees.

IV. Although inherently more stable, the vessel's maneuvering characteristics are greatly diminished when the vessel is fully loaded and in a "tanked down" condition. Slowing

and stopping the vessel is delayed greatly due to the amount of weight added by the catch and the water in the fish holds.

b. Crew: While fishing, the majority of the deck crew is staged on the back-deck, preparing the net, setting up the deck for a set, and repairing the net. At any one time during the fishing evolution, there would be approximately 20 to 25 people working on the stern of the vessel.

Active Human error:

a. Helicopter Operation: Mr. [REDACTED] deliberately placed helicopter N471M in a hover directly in front of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. Mr. [REDACTED] put himself and Mr. Wang in danger by hovering with his tail to the oncoming vessel, minimizing his visibility of the vessel.

b. Vessel Navigation: Mr. [REDACTED] made no initial attempt to steer the vessel away from the helicopter once he realized the helicopter had settled into a hover over the FAD. Neither the Captain, nor the Chief Mate was on watch at the time of the collision. Mr. [REDACTED] does not hold a navigation license and he was on watch at the helm. Mr. [REDACTED] does not have official mandated navigation training.

2. The causal factors which were determined to have led to the subsequent events of injury and death are as follows:

Active Human error:

a. Helicopter: Mr. [REDACTED] did not keep situational awareness of the location and proximity of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER. The tether-line attached to Mr. Wang did not have a quick-release hook located on both ends.

b. Navigation: Once Mr. [REDACTED] determined he could not avoid the collision, he did not turn the vessel to Port or Starboard because of the risk the helicopter rotor posed to the entire crew working on the back deck and net. Since he could not stop the forward progress of the vessel, he placed the throttle position in neutral so as not to cause any further injury to personnel from the propeller's movement.

c. The Rescue Attempt: The rescuers that assisted in rescue attempts for the helicopter crew did not have adequate training in search and rescue techniques. As the rescuers approached the wreckage, one of the rescuers, Mr. [REDACTED] jumped onto the wreckage. He fell into an opening on the helicopter that had broken glass and sharp metal, which resulted in his injuries.

Recommendations:

Safety

1. It is recommended that the manning exemption waiver authorized for Distant Water Tuna Fleet vessels by the Coast Guard Authorization Act be rescinded. In order to create a more cohesive command structure, all Officer positions aboard U.S. Commercial Fishing Vessels should be filled by USCG licensed Mariners. In addition, in order for the USCG to hold a ship's Officer accountable for their actions or inactions, that Officer must be licensed by the USCG.
2. It is recommended that all crewmembers aboard U.S. Commercial Fishing Vessels who are in charge of the navigation of the vessel be required to receive training on basic navigation rules.
3. It is recommended that all officers and crewmembers that are assigned to navigate a U.S. Commercial Fishing Vessel speak English as the vessel's common working language.
4. It is recommended that all crewmembers, regardless of their responsibilities onboard, attend mandatory vessel familiarization training, similar to the requirements of Chapter VI of Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping.
5. It is recommended that the practice of allowing fish spotters to exit helicopters in operation be stopped. In any case, the tether-line should have a quick-release hook on the belt of the person, not inside the helicopter.
6. It is recommended that U.S. Commercial Fishing Vessels be required to comply with the requirements of the International Safety Management Code (ISM).
7. It is recommended that the IMO Code of Safety for Fisherman and Fishing Vessels be adopted by the U.S. to apply to all Commercial Fishing Vessels.

Enforcement

1. It is recommended that a Civil Penalty be issued against SPTC for allowing the Fish Master onboard F/V PACIFIC RANGER, Mr. [REDACTED] who was at the helm and in charge of the navigation watch without actually holding the necessary credentials. IAW 14CFR15.401 "A person may not employ or engage an individual, and an individual may not serve, in a position by law or regulation to hold a license, certificate of registry, merchant mariner's document, and/or merchant mariner's credential unless the individual holds all credentials required, as appropriate".
2. It is recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration and the National Transportation Safety Board further investigate the actions of the pilot of helicopter N471M, Mr. [REDACTED] for failing to keep clear of all vessels and impeding their navigating, IAW 14 CFR 91.115(a), failure to proceed with careful regard to existing circumstances, including the limitations of the respective craft, IAW 14 CFR 91.115(e), and operating an aircraft closer than 500 feet from the F/V PACIFIC RANGER, IAW 14 CFR 91.119(c).

3. It is recommended that the National Transportation Safety Board further investigate the actions of the F/V PACIFIC RANGER for failure to proceed with careful regard to existing circumstances, including the limitations of the respective craft, IAW 14 CFR 91.115(e).

Other

1. It is recommended that Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] Mr. [REDACTED] and Mr. [REDACTED] be awarded the Coast Guard Public Service Commendation.
2. It is recommended that this casualty investigation be closed.

#



United States Coast Guard

MISLE Incident Investigation Report For MAKAH MAID Loss of Propulsion

On 01Sep2013 00:00:00 Z



MISLE Activity Number: 4708092
MISLE Case Number: 654433

I. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION – GENERAL INFORMATION

I.I EXCEPTIONS

Marine Casualty Investigation: No

Criteria Met:

Pollution Investigation: NA

Criteria Met:

Personnel Investigation: NA

Criteria Met:

I.II DETAILS

Incident Involves: Marine Casualty, Reportable

Level Of Investigation: Informal

IMO Classification: Routine

US Classification: Routine

Serious Marine Incident: No

Was a Marine Board convened by Commandant? No

I.III LOCATIONS

<u>Description</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR	48°20.5 N	124°59.0 W

I.IV INVOLVED PERSONNEL

I.V INVOLVED TEAM

I.VI INVOLVED SUBJECTS

Involved Vessels

Name:	MAKAH MAID
Flag:	UNITED STATES
Primary VIN:	515879
Call Sign:	
Damage Status:	Undamaged
Role:	Involved in a Marine Casualty
Classification, Type, Subtype:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage:	
Net Tonnage:	
Dead Wt. Tonnage:	
Length:	32.8
Home/Hailing Port:	
Keel Laid Date:	
Delivery Date:	
Place of Construction:	TACOMA, Washington, UNITED STATES
Builder Name:	
Propulsion Type:	
Ahead HP:	
Master:	
Classification Society:	
Owner:	

Operator:
Inspection Subchapter:
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:

Involved Persons

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: Male
Age: 44
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date: 20Aug1969
Email Address:
Phone Number:
Address (Mailing): po box 813neah bay, WA 98357 US
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender:
Age:
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (NVDC Phone Number): [REDACTED]
Address (Home/Primary Residence): [REDACTED]

Comments:

Drug and Alcohol Testing. The following people have been determined by the Coast Guard, Law Enforcement Personnel, and/or the Marine Employer to have been directly involved in a Serious Marine Incident as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2:

Involved Organizations: None

Involved Facilities: None

Involved Waterways: None

Involved Other Subjects: None

II. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION – GENERAL INFORMATION

On 1 Sep 13 at 1511 local time, the 14 GT, uninspected commercial fishing vessel, MAKAH MAID (515879), lost propulsion 5 nautical miles offshore while transiting from where they were fishing to Neah Bay, WA.

Personnel Casualty Summary

Total Missing = 0

Total Dead = 0
Total Injured = 0
Total At Risk, Not Injured = 0
Total People At Risk = 0

Vessel(s) Status Summary

Actual Total Loss = 0
Total Constructive Loss Salvaged = 0
Total Constructive Loss Unsalvaged = 0
Damaged = 0
Undamaged = 1

Property Damage Summary

Vessel(s) = \$ 0
Cargo = \$ 0
Facility(s) = \$ 0
Other = \$ 0

* Includes estimates

II.I LOCATIONS

<u>Description</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR	48°20.5 N	124°59.0 W

II.II INVOLVED PERSONNEL

Name: [REDACTED]

Team Lead: No
Point Of Contact: No
Role: Investigation Administration/Review
Status: Assigned
Department Id: 007636
Type/Rank: Officer - Military Officer (O4)
Agency Type/Agency: Federal - DHS/Federal - DHS
Source Id/Source: 2011731/Direct Access Personnel
Comments:

II.III INVOLVED TEAM

II.IV INVOLVED SUBJECTS

Involved Vessels

Name:	MAKAH MAID
Flag:	UNITED STATES
Primary VIN:	515879
Call Sign:	
Damage Status:	Undamaged
Role:	Involved in a Marine Casualty
Classification, Type, Subtype:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage:	
Net Tonnage:	
Dead Wt. Tonnage:	
Length:	32.8

Home/Hailing Port:
Keel Laid Date:
Delivery Date:
Place of Construction: TACOMA, Washington, UNITED STATES
Builder Name:
Propulsion Type:
Ahead HP:
Master: [REDACTED]
Classification Society:
Owner: [REDACTED]
Operator:
Inspection Subchapter:
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:

Involved Persons

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: Male
Age: 44

SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date: [REDACTED]
Email Address:
Phone Number:
Address (Mailing): [REDACTED]
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Subject of Investigation

Gender:
Age:
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (NVDC Phone Number): [REDACTED]
Address (Home/Primary Residence): [REDACTED]

Comments:

Drug and Alcohol Testing. The following people have been determined by the Coast Guard, Law Enforcement Personnel, and/or the Marine Employer to have been directly involved in a Serious Marine Incident as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2:

Involved Organizations: None

Involved Facilities: None

Involved Waterways

PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR

Role: Location
Description: Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR

Involved Other Subjects: None

II.V EVIDENCE

Control Number: 4708092-01-LRA

Description: CG-2692 drafted off of conversation with master on 6Sep13.

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 02Dec2013 13:40:00 Z

Location: Sector Puget Sound

Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC PgtSnd, SEC PgtSnd

Attachments

CG_2692; CG-2692-Rpt of Marine, Comm Dive, or OCS Casualty;

10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: 4708092-MISLE-001

Description: MISLE Notification #602587 for report of incident received by VHF/FM (Channel 16) voice.

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 01Sep2013 22:24:00 Z

Location: Sector Puget Sound

Collected By: [REDACTED] SEC PgtSnd, Sector Puget Sound

Attachments

II.VI TIMELINE

01Sep2013 00:00:00 Z to 01Sep2013 00:00:00 Z (Estimated): No major maintenance was completed recently on the vessel.

Timeline Type: Condition

Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition

Location: Unknown

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
MAKAH MAID	Vessel	Undamaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Engineering

Subsystem: Sea-water System (primary cooling)

Component: Pump

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

Failure/Malfunction Type:

01Sep2013 15:11:00 Z to 01Sep2013 15:11:00 Z (Known): The water pump belt broke.

Timeline Type: Event

Timeline Subtype: Material Failure/Malfunction

Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes

Description: Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR

Latitude: 48°20.5 N

Longitude: 124°59.0 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
MAKAH MAID	Vessel	Undamaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Engineering

Subsystem: Sea-water System (primary cooling)

Component: Pump

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

Failure/Malfunction Type: Non-Catastrophic Failure/Malfunction Requiring Repair/Replacement

01Sep2013 15:12:00 Z to 01Sep2013 15:12:00 Z (Known): The engine was shut down by the master and he radioed for a tow.

Timeline Type: Event

Timeline Subtype: Loss/Reduction of Vessel Propulsion/Steering

Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes

Description: Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR

Latitude: 48°20.5 N

Longitude: 124°59.0 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
MAKAH MAID	Vessel	Undamaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

II.VII CORRESPONDENCE

Material/Equipment Component Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 9/1/2013 12:00:00 AM

Attachments:

3906843; Other;

; 11Sep2015 00:48:21 Z; Yes

Material/Equipment Component Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 9/1/2013 3:11:00 PM

Attachments:

6274013; Other;

; 11Sep2015 00:48:21 Z; Yes

COMDT FAM

Source: USCG

Date: 5/19/2022 3:39:10 PM

Attachments:

4708092_MAKAH_MAID_FAM_18May2022; Other;

19May2022 15:39:47 Z; No

II.VIII CONCLUSIONS – PART 1. CAUSE

Initiating Event:

Material Failure/Malfunction (01Sep2013 15:11:00 Z)

Precondition

Mismatch - Between Person and Software - Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo

Preventative maintenance was not being conducted.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (01Sep2013 00:00:00 Z); Location Unknown; No major maintenance was completed recently on the vessel.; MAKAH MAID

Other - Material Failure (Vessels)

The water pump belt had not been looked at to see if it needed to be replaced and therefore was not replaced prior to it breaking. This belt breaking caused the cooling water supply pump to stop working.

Event/Material Failure/Malfunction (01Sep2013 15:11:00 Z); Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR ; The water pump belt broke.; MAKAH MAID

Defense

Missing - Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo

Preventative maintenance was not being conducted.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (01Sep2013 00:00:00 Z); Location Unknown; No major maintenance was completed recently on the vessel.; MAKAH MAID

Missing - Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo

Owner does not know what appropriate preventative maintenance for his vessel engine should be conducted.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (01Sep2013 00:00:00 Z); Location Unknown; No major maintenance was completed recently on the vessel.; MAKAH MAID

Inadequate - Material Failure (Vessels)

The water pump belt breaking caused the cooling water supply pump to stop working, which led the engine to overheat. The operator shut down the engine and required to be towed in because he could not restart the engine.

Event/Material Failure/Malfunction (01Sep2013 15:11:00 Z); Makau Bay, WA: PACIFIC DEEP WATER SPUR ; The water pump belt broke.; MAKAH MAID

Failures of Defense Against Subsequent Events in the Incident

Subsequent Event # 1:

Loss/Reduction of Vessel Propulsion/Steering (01Sep2013 15:12:00 Z)

Defense Factors

Does Not Exist - Engine required to be shut down after water pump belt broke.

The engine would need to be shut down after the water pump belt broke. The water pump provides cooling water to the engine. Had the master continued to operate the engine without the cooling water provided to the engine, the engine would have overheated and been damaged.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition(01Sep2013 00:00:00Z); Location Unknown; No major maintenance was completed recently on the vessel.; MAKAH MAID

II.IX CONCLUSIONS – PART 2. ENFORCEMENT REFERRALS

None

II.X SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

Safety Recommendation # 1 : Establish a maintenance program

The owner of the MAKAH MAID did not have an established maintenance program for the vessel. There is also no method for recording what work has been done on the vessel.

RECOMMEND that the owner of the MAKAH MAID develop a written maintenance program for the vessel using best engineering practices. The maintenance program should include internal compartment inspections; hull exams (conducted at drydock and/or in the water); shaft inspections; rudder examinations; machinery maintenance to include deck gear, propulsion engines, electrical systems, bilge manifold system, etc. It is recommended that the recording of any completed maintenance be kept in a safe location off of the boat.

The implementation of this safety recommendation is intended to reduce the risk of any additional marine casualties, which may be related to the material condition of the vessel or the lack of maintenance being conducted on board the vessel.

Date Created: 08Jan2014 Z
Current Owner Unit: COMDT INV
Date Last Modified: 10Sep2015 18:44:38 Z
Priority: Normal

Final Agency Action:
Final Agency Comment:

Safety Recommendation # 004595 : Develop regulations for commercial fishing vessel maintenance program

Currently, there are no regulations requiring commercial fishing vessels to have any type of maintenance program nor method of recording what work has been completed on the vessel.

RECOMMEND CG-CVC-3 write regulations requiring all commercial fishing vessels to develop a maintenance program using best engineering practices. The maintenance program to include, but not limited to: internal compartment inspections; hull exams (conducted at drydock and/or in the water); shaft inspections; rudder examinations; machinery maintenance to include deck gear, propulsion engines, electrical systems, bilge manifold system, etc. It is recommended that the recording of any completed maintenance be kept in a safe location off of the vessel.

The implementation of this safety recommendation is intended to reduce the risk of any additional marine casualties for the entire fishing fleet, which may be related to the material condition of the vessel or the lack of maintenance being conducted on board the vessel.

Date Created: 14Jan2014 Z
Current Owner Unit: COMDT INV
Date Last Modified: 10Sep2015 18:44:38 Z
Priority: Normal
Final Agency Action:
Final Agency Comment:

Safety Alerts:



United States Coast Guard

MISLE Incident Investigation Report For CFV LANGLEY DOUGLAS - EQUIPMENT FAILURE

On 07Mar2015 00:00:00 Z



MISLE Activity Number: 5081789
MISLE Case Number: 718440

I. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION – GENERAL INFORMATION

I.I EXCEPTIONS

Marine Casualty Investigation: No

Criteria Met:

Pollution Investigation: NA

Criteria Met:

Personnel Investigation: NA

Criteria Met:

I.II DETAILS

Incident Involves: Marine Casualty, Reportable; USCG Credentialed Mariner, Alleged Violation of Law/Regulation

Level Of Investigation: Informal

IMO Classification: Routine

US Classification: Routine

Serious Marine Incident: No

Was a Marine Board convened by Commandant? No

I.III LOCATIONS

<u>Description</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE	37°17.4 N	075°17.2 W
30nm East of Cape Charles	37°09.5 N	075°09.5 W

I.IV INVOLVED PERSONNEL

I.V INVOLVED TEAM

I.VI INVOLVED SUBJECTS

Involved Vessels

Name:	LANGLEY DOUGLAS
Flag:	UNITED STATES
Primary VIN:	606719
Call Sign:	WQZ2234
Damage Status:	Damaged
Role:	Involved in a Marine Casualty
Classification, Type, Subtype:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage:	
Net Tonnage:	
Dead Wt. Tonnage:	
Length:	79.9
Home/Hailing Port:	
Keel Laid Date:	
Delivery Date:	
Place of Construction:	BAYOU LA BATRE, Alabama, UNITED STATES
Builder Name:	
Propulsion Type:	Diesel
Ahead HP:	960

Master: [REDACTED]
Classification Society:
Owner:
Operator:
Inspection Subchapter:
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:

Involved Persons

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Subject of Investigation
Gender: Male
Age: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date: [REDACTED]
Email Address:
Phone Number:
Address (Home/Primary Residence): [REDACTED]
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender: Male
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (Primary): [REDACTED]
Address (Primary): [REDACTED]
Comments: Tech Rep

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender: Male
Age: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date: [REDACTED]
Email Address:
Phone Number (Mobile): [REDACTED]
Address (Home/Primary Residence): [REDACTED]
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender:
Age:
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (Phone Number): [REDACTED]
Address (Home/Primary Residence): [REDACTED]
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender: [REDACTED]
Age: [REDACTED]
SSN: [REDACTED]
Birth Date: [REDACTED]
Email Address:

Phone Number (Mobile):

Address (Primary):

Comments:

Drug and Alcohol Testing. The following people have been determined by the Coast Guard, Law Enforcement Personnel, and/or the Marine Employer to have been directly involved in a Serious Marine Incident as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2:

Involved Organizations

A & D FISHERIES

Role:

Subject of Investigation

Email Address:

Phone Number:

Address (Primary):

101 S. King St. Hampton, VA 23669 US

Comments:

JIM HOWARD MARINE DIESEL SERVICE

Role:

Other

Email Address:

Phone Number (Primary):

757-486-4786

Address (Primary):

572 Chancery Lane Virginia Beach, VA 23452 US

Comments:

Involved Facilities: None

Involved Waterways: None

Involved Other Subjects: None

II. INCIDENT INVESTIGATION – GENERAL INFORMATION

On March 06, 2015 the CFV LANGLEY DOUGLAS (O.N. 606719) sailed from Hampton, VA heading to Boston, MA. While the vessel was operating 30 miles offshore they experienced a loss of propulsion due to a transmission failure. The vessel was towed back to Hampton, VA by the USCGC SEAHORSE for repairs. No injuries, pollution or damage to the vessel. During the investigation it was discovered that the vessel was operating with an expired Certificate of Documentation.

Recommend this case be closed with a referral to enforcement.

Personnel Casualty Summary

Total Missing = 0

Total Dead = 0

Total Injured = 0

Total At Risk, Not Injured = 0

Total People At Risk = 0

Vessel(s) Status Summary

Actual Total Loss = 0

Total Constructive Loss Salvaged = 0

Total Constructive Loss Unsalvaged = 0

Damaged = 1

Undamaged = 0

Property Damage Summary

Vessel(s) = \$ 3403

Cargo = \$ 0

Facility(s) = \$ 0

Other = \$ 0

* Includes estimates

II.I LOCATIONS

<u>Description</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
30nm East of Cape Charles	37°09.5 N	075°09.5 W
Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE	37°17.4 N	075°17.2 W
30nm East of Cape Charles	37°09.5 N	075°09.5 W

II.II INVOLVED PERSONNEL

Name: [REDACTED]

Team Lead: No

Point Of Contact: No

Role: Investigation General - Legacy

Status:

Department Id: 007589

Type/Rank: Officer - Military Officer (O5)

Agency Type/Agency: Unknown/Unknown

Source Id/Source: 2018417/Direct Access Personnel

Comments:

Name: [REDACTED]

Team Lead: No

Point Of Contact: No

Role: Investigation General - Legacy

Status:

Department Id: 007591

Type/Rank: Officer - Military Officer (O4)

Agency Type/Agency: Unknown/Unknown

Source Id/Source: 2068949/Direct Access Personnel

Comments:

Name: [REDACTED]

Team Lead: No

Point Of Contact: No

Role: Investigation General - Legacy

Status:

Department Id: CGRETDEPT

Type/Rank: Civilian - GS-13

Agency Type/Agency: Unknown/Unknown

Source Id/Source: 1045556/Direct Access Personnel

Comments:

Name: [REDACTED]

Team Lead: No

Point Of Contact: No

Role: Investigation General - Legacy

Status:

Department Id: 007589

Type/Rank: Officer - Military Officer (O4)

Agency Type/Agency: Unknown/Unknown

Source Id/Source: 1250367/Direct Access Personnel

Comments:

II.III INVOLVED TEAM

II.IV INVOLVED SUBJECTS

Involved Vessels

Name:	LANGLEY DOUGLAS
Flag:	UNITED STATES
Primary VIN:	606719
Call Sign:	WQZ2234
Damage Status:	Damaged
Role:	Involved in a Marine Casualty
Classification, Type, Subtype:	Fishing Vessel, Fish Catching Vessel, General
Gross Tonnage:	
Net Tonnage:	
Dead Wt. Tonnage:	
Length:	79.9
Home/Hailing Port:	
Keel Laid Date:	
Delivery Date:	
Place of Construction:	BAYOU LA BATRE, Alabama, UNITED STATES
Builder Name:	
Propulsion Type:	Diesel
Ahead HP:	960
Master:	[REDACTED]
Classification Society:	
Owner:	
Operator:	A & D FISHERIES
Inspection Subchapter:	
Most Recent Vessel Inspection Activity:	

Involved Persons

[REDACTED]	
Status:	Not at Risk
Role:	Subject of Investigation
Gender:	[REDACTED]
Age:	[REDACTED]
SSN:	[REDACTED]
Birth Date:	[REDACTED]
Email Address:	
Phone Number:	
Address (Home/Primary Residence):	[REDACTED]
Comments:	
[REDACTED]	

Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender: Male
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (Primary):
Address (Primary):
Comments: Tech Rep

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender:
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (Mobile):
Address (Home/Primary Residence):
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender:
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (Phone Number):
Address (Home/Primary Residence):
Comments:

[REDACTED]
Status: Not at Risk
Role: Witness
Gender:
Age:
SSN:
Birth Date:
Email Address:
Phone Number (Mobile):
Address (Primary):
Comments:

Drug and Alcohol Testing. The following people have been determined by the Coast Guard, Law Enforcement Personnel, and/or the Marine Employer to have been directly involved in a Serious Marine Incident as defined in 46 CFR 4.03-2:

Involved Organizations

A & D FISHERIES
Role: Subject of Investigation
Email Address:
Phone Number:
Address (Primary): 101 S. King St.Hampton, VA 23669 US
Comments:

JIM HOWARD MARINE DIESEL SERVICE
Role: Other
Email Address:
Phone Number (Primary): 757-486-4786
Address (Primary): 572 Chancery LaneVirginia Beach, VA 23452 US
Comments:

Involved Facilities: None

Involved Waterways

NORTH ATLANTIC OCEAN

Role:

Description:

Location

30nm East of Cape Charles

Involved Other Subjects: None

II.V EVIDENCE

Control Number: 5081789-MISLE-001

Description: MISLE Notification #680989 for report of incident received by Telephone call to Coast Guard.

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 07Mar2015 11:12:00 Z

Location: Sector Hampton Roads

Collected By: [REDACTED] SEC Virginia, Sector Hampton Roads

Attachments

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#001_MAM

Description: CG 2692

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 19Mar2015 15:57:00 Z

Location: Sector Hampton Roads

Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#001_MAM (2692); CG-2692-Rpt of Marine, Comm Dive, or OCS Casualty;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#002_MAM

Description: Involved Parties Worksheet

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 19Mar2015 15:59:00 Z

Location: Sector Hampton Roads

Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#002_MAM (Involved Parties Worksheet); Other;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#003_MAM
Description: Master Witness Statement
Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 19Mar2015 16:01:00 Z
Location: Sector Hampton Roads
Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#003_MAM (Master Witness Statement); Documentary Evidence;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#004_MAM
Description: Tech Report
Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 19Mar2015 16:02:00 Z
Location: Sector Hampton Roads
Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#004_MAM (Tech Report); Legacy - Unknown;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#005_MAM
Description: Logbook Entry
Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 19Mar2015 16:03:00 Z
Location: Sector Hampton Roads
Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#005_MAM (Log Book Entry); Other;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#006_MAM
Description: Certificate of Documentation
Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 24Mar2015 12:45:00 Z
Location: Sector Hampton Roads
Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#006_MAM (Certificate of Documentation); Legacy - Unknown;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#007_MAM

Description: IO Statement

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 07Jun2015 07:35:00 Z

Location: Sector Hampton Roads

Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#007_MAM (IO Statement); Documentary Evidence;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

Control Number: ECN_5081789_#008_MAM

Description: Photo Evidence Sheet

Evidence Type: Standard

Collection Information

Date/Time: 08Jun2015 13:12:00 Z

Location: LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Collected By: [REDACTED]; SEC Virginia, SEC HamptnRds

Attachments

ECN_5081789_#008_MAM (Photo Evidence Sheet); Documentary Evidence;
10Sep2015 21:17:57 Z; No

II.VI TIMELINE

06Mar2014 08:00:00 Z to 06Mar2015 08:00:00 Z (Estimated): The marine employer failed to maintain a valid Certificate of Documentation (COD) on the vessel while engaged in Fisheries trade in violation of 46 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 67.7 and 67.323.

Timeline Type: Action

Timeline Subtype: Alleged Criminal/Civil Offense

Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes

Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N

Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Subject of Investigation

06Mar2015 17:00:00 Z to 06Mar2015 17:00:00 Z (Estimated): There are no procedures in place for the maintenance of engine room machinery.

Timeline Type: Condition

Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition

Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes

Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N

Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Documentation

Subsystem: Certificates/Documents

Component: Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

06Mar2015 18:00:00 Z to 06Mar2015 18:00:00 Z (Estimated): Prior to departure the master conducted a navigation and propulsion check with no issues noted.

Timeline Type: Action

Timeline Subtype: Engineering Operations - Engineering Systems Inspection and Testing

Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes

Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N

Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
██████████	Person	Not at Risk	Subject of Investigation

06Mar2015 20:01:00 Z to 06Mar2015 20:01:00 Z (Estimated): The transmission's drive ring and drive blocks are fatigued.

Timeline Type: Condition

Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition

Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes

Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N

Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Engineering

Subsystem: Reduction Gearing/Clutches

Component: Gear

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

Failure/Malfunction Type:

06Mar2015 20:30:00 Z to 06Mar2015 20:30:00 Z (Estimated): The vessel departs Sunset Creek in Hampton, VA heading towards Boston, MA.

Timeline Type: Condition
Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Communications

Subsystem: Audible Communications

Component: Gong

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

07Mar2015 04:00:00 Z to 07Mar2015 04:00:00 Z (Estimated): The main engine's rpm is higher than normal.

Timeline Type: Condition
Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Engineering

Subsystem: Reduction Gearing/Clutches

Component: Gear

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

Failure/Malfunction Type:

07Mar2015 04:05:00 Z to 07Mar2015 04:05:00 Z (Estimated): The master reduces the speed of the vessel.

Timeline Type: Action
Timeline Subtype: Bridge Operations - Shiphandling
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Subject of Investigation

07Mar2015 06:00:00 Z to 07Mar2015 06:00:00 Z (Estimated): The vessel's main propulsion system shuts down.

Timeline Type: Event
Timeline Subtype: Material Failure/Malfunction
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Engineering

Subsystem: Reduction Gearing/Clutches

Component: Gear

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

Failure/Malfunction Type: Non-Catastrophic Failure/Malfunction Requiring Repair/Replacement

07Mar2015 06:01:00 Z to 07Mar2015 06:01:00 Z (Estimated): Vessel experiences a total loss of maneuverability.

Timeline Type: Event
Timeline Subtype: Loss/Reduction of Vessel Propulsion/Steering
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

07Mar2015 06:05:00 Z to 07Mar2015 06:05:00 Z (Estimated): The master inspects the marine gear on the transmission and finds the failure of the gear's drive ring and blocks.

Timeline Type: Action
Timeline Subtype: Engineering Operations - Engineering Systems Inspection and Testing
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Subject of Investigation

07Mar2015 06:20:00 Z to 07Mar2015 06:20:00 Z (Estimated): The vessel's main propulsion control system cannot engage the transmission.

Timeline Type: Condition
Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Communications

Subsystem: Alarms/Indicators

Component: Fire Alarm

Cite:

Involves CG Approved Equipment: No

Security Violation: No

Deficiency: No

07Mar2015 13:00:00 Z to 07Mar2015 13:00:00 Z (Estimated): The USCGC SEAHORSE tows the vessel to Sunset Creek, in Hampton, VA.

Timeline Type: Action
Timeline Subtype: Safety and Emergency Operations - General Safety
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Subject of Investigation

08Mar2015 09:00:00 Z to 08Mar2015 09:00:00 Z (Estimated): A technician comes aboard vessel to replace damaged drive ring.

Timeline Type: Action
Timeline Subtype: Engineering Operations - Unscheduled, Corrective Repair
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Subject of Investigation

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Witness

11Mar2015 13:00:00 Z to 11Mar2015 13:00:00 Z (Estimated): The marine gear is tested and found satisfactory by the technician.

Timeline Type: Action
Timeline Subtype: Engineering Operations - Engineering Systems Inspection and Testing
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
[REDACTED]	Person	Not at Risk	Witness

11Mar2015 14:00:00 Z to 11Mar2015 14:00:00 Z (Estimated): The vessel returns back to service.

Timeline Type: Condition
Timeline Subtype: Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition
Location: Known

Primary Location: Yes
Description: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Latitude: 37°17.4 N Longitude: 075°17.2 W

Subject(s) and Details

<u>Name</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Status</u>	<u>Role</u>
LANGLEY DOUGLAS	Vessel	Damaged	Involved in a Marine Casualty

System: Communications
 Subsystem: Automatic Identification System (AIS)
 Component: 12 Channel DGPS Receiver
 Cite:
Involves CG Approved Equipment: No
 Security Violation: Yes
 Deficiency: No

II.VII CORRESPONDENCE

Vessel Activity Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 3/7/2015 6:20:00 AM

Attachments:

4909284; Other;
; 11Sep2015 00:48:50 Z; Yes

Material/Equipment Component Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 3/6/2015 8:01:00 PM

Attachments:

5476322; Other;
; 11Sep2015 00:48:50 Z; Yes

Material/Equipment Component Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 3/7/2015 4:00:00 AM

Attachments:

5551262; Other;
; 11Sep2015 00:48:50 Z; Yes

Material/Equipment Component Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 3/7/2015 6:00:00 AM

Attachments:

7530575; Other;
; 11Sep2015 00:48:50 Z; Yes

Vessel Activity Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 3/6/2015 8:30:00 PM

Attachments:

8606840; Other;
; 11Sep2015 00:48:50 Z; Yes

Vessel Activity Details from MISLE Legacy Activity

Source: USCG

Date: 3/11/2015 2:00:00 PM

Attachments:

9868337; Other;
; 11Sep2015 00:48:50 Z; Yes

COMDT Final Action Memo

Source: USCG

Date: 6/28/2022 6:07:39 PM

Attachments:

5081789_LANGLEY DOUGLAS_AFAM; Other;
[REDACTED]; 28Jun2022 18:08:22 Z; No

II.VIII CONCLUSIONS – PART 1. CAUSE

Initiating Event:

Material Failure/Malfunction (07Mar2015 06:00:00 Z)

Organization

Laws/Regulations - Policy, Procedures, or Regulations

There are no regulations that require marine operators to maintain their machinery to an inspected standard.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (06Mar2015 17:00:00 Z); Aboard Vessel:
LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE ; There are no procedures in
place for the maintenance of engine room machinery.
; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Procedures - Policy, Procedures, or Regulations

The company does not have any policies set in place such as a preventative maintenance system for engine room machinery.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (06Mar2015 17:00:00 Z); Aboard Vessel:
LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE ; There are no procedures in
place for the maintenance of engine room machinery.
; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Precondition

Vessel/Facility/Equipment (Hardware)– Condition - Vessel, Facility, Equipment, Gear, or Cargo

The transmission's wear ring was fatigued prior to the Captain getting way for a voyage from Hampton, Va to Boston, Ma. This is due to the lack of policies/standards that would address the inspection and maintenance of vital equipment.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (06Mar2015 20:01:00 Z); Aboard Vessel:
LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE ; The transmission's drive ring
and drive blocks are fatigued.; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Other - Material Failure (Vessels)

The transmission's wear ring actively failed while in operation due to the lack of maintenance. This was evident when the rpms of the main engine increased once it became disconnected from the transmission due to the worn ring.

Event/Material Failure/Malfunction (07Mar2015 06:00:00 Z); Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS:
ATLANTIC DEEP WATE ; The vessel's main propulsion system shuts down.;
LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Defense

Missing - Policy, Procedures, or Regulations

Even though there are no regulations set in place to require a standard for commercial fishing vessels it is reasonable to expect a company standard to maintain their vessel in a seaworthy condition. The company's standard should require the inspection and maintenance of vital machinery equipment.

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition (06Mar2015 17:00:00 Z); Aboard Vessel:
LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE ; There are no procedures in
place for the maintenance of engine room machinery.
; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Does Not Exist - Vessel Maneuverability

There are no engineering defenses that would have prevented the total loss in maneuverability. The vessel was equipped with a single engine, single propeller and no bow thruster. Without the assistance of the Coast Guard Cutter they would have drifted until someone would have helped. If the vessel were to be equipped with two engines and two propellers then they could have had a reduction in maneuverability which could have helped them return back to Hampton, VA without any assistance.

Event/Loss/Reduction of Vessel Propulsion/Steering (07Mar2015 06:01:00 Z); Aboard Vessel:
LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE ; Vessel experiences a total loss
of maneuverability.; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Failures of Defense Against Subsequent Events in the Incident

Subsequent Event # 1:

Loss/Reduction of Vessel Propulsion/Steering (07Mar2015 06:01:00 Z)

Defense Factors

Other - loss
reduction

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition(07Mar2015 06:20:00Z);
Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE
; The vessel's main propulsion control system cannot engage the
transmission.; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

Condition/Vessel - Material/Equipment Condition(11Mar2015 14:00:00Z);
Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE
; The vessel returns back to service.; LANGLEY DOUGLAS

II.IX CONCLUSIONS – PART 2. ENFORCEMENT REFERRALS

The following referrals for enforcement action have been made as a result of this investigation and represent those instances where the Coast Guard has gathered evidence that indicates one or more alleged violations or offenses may have occurred. Any determinations as to whether or not one or more actual violations or offenses have occurred are documented in the appropriate Coast Guard enforcement activities.

Referral #1:

██████████. LOW
Party: ██████████
Enforcement Type: Warning
Status: Closed - Agency Action Complete

Alleged Violations

Cite: 46CFR5.33
Date/Time: 06Mar2014 08:00 Z
Event/Action/Condition: Alleged Criminal/Civil Offense
Location: Aboard Vessel: LANGLEY DOUGLAS: ATLANTIC DEEP WATE

Subject(s): ██████████

Evidence

ECN_5081789_#006_MAM; Certificate of Documentation; 24Mar2015 12:45:00 Z

II.X SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

Safety Recommendation # 004938 : Safety Management System (SMS) Requirements for Commercial Fishing Vessels

It is recommended that the Commandant of the United States Coast Guard require commercial fishing vessels to comply with a Safety Management System (SMS), as required by the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2010 and 46 United States Code (USC) 3203. This portion of the USC requires a SMS that will establish policy and require evaluation and auditing of established policies and procedures. The establishment of a SMS was designed for organizations to identify areas to mitigate risks and create measures for implementation by employees (e.g. reporting procedures, preventative maintenance schedules, etc.).

Date Created: 11Jun2015 Z
Current Owner Unit: COMDT INV
Date Last Modified: 10Sep2015 18:44:38 Z
Priority: Normal

Final Agency Action:
Final Agency Comment:

Safety Alerts: